1. General Background

• ethics;
• lobbying;
• money in politics;
• Cabinet appointments (especially of key government accountability watchdogs);
• government contracting (including for polling and advertising);
• whistleblower protection;
• access-to-information, and;
• budgeting and auditing.

2. Background on Changes Needed to Bill C-2 (the FAA)

As detailed below, the proposed "Conflict of Interest Act" section of the FAA fails to close four of the five loopholes that the Conservative Party and Stephen Harper pledged to close before and during the federal election campaign.

In addition, the Conservatives failed to include five other key measures which are in the current Code in the proposed "Conflict of Interest Act" section of the FAA. The news release and background information released by the Conservatives when the FAA was introduced falsely claimed that all of the measures in the current Code were included in the proposed "Conflict of Interest Act."

Incredibly, one of the ways in which the Prime Minister, and Treasury Board minister John Baird, have not acted with honesty is that they failed to mention in any of the materials released to the public when the FAA was introduced, nor in any subsequent interview, that the FAA proposes to remove from the Code the key ethics rule that requires senior politicians, their staff, and senior public servants to "act with honesty". 

Many other measures that were promised by the Conservatives during the federal election, and since the election, were not included in the FAA.

In total, the Conservatives have broken 13 promises or acted dishonestly by failing to include measures in the Code and the FAA. 

As well, eight (8) other promised measures that would have strengthened the federal Access to Information Act (ATI Act) were not included in the FAA. While these much-studied measures (many of which have been in place for years in some Canadian provincial access-to-information laws) have been referred to the Access, Ethics and Privacy Committee of the House of Commons for further study and may be incorporated into another bill that is passed by Parliament, the further study is unnecessary and delays, if not derails, the implementation of these key open government changes.

Set out below are 140 changes needed to Bill C-2 to force the federal Conservatives to keep their election promises, and to ensure that everyone involved in the federal government is effectively required to act honestly, ethically, openly, representatively, and to prevent waste.

The basis of the proposed changes are the platforms of the nation-wide 31-member group Government Ethics Coalition and the nation-wide, 50-member group Money in Politics Coalition (the groups in these coalitions have a total membership of more than 3.2 million Canadians) and the platform of the 10-member group Open Government Canada coalition (To see details about these coalitions, click on the relevant link on the following webpage: http://www.dwatch.ca/camp/camplist.htm)

All of the coalitions' platforms are based on historical experience which has proven that, in order to ensure people working in large, powerful organizations such as government institutions follow the rules:

• the rules must have no loopholes; 
• the institutions must operate as transparently as possible;
• enforcement agencies must be fully independent, well-resourced and fully empowered (including having the power to penalize rule violators in significant ways), and;
• whistleblowers must be effectively protected.

If the proposed changes set out below are not made to Bill C-2, the "Federal Accountability Act" (FAA):

• lying to the public will still be legal, and as a result (of course) not penalized (the FAA will, if not changed, delete the only ethics rule that requires Cabinet ministers, their staff and senior public servants to "act with honesty");
• Cabinet ministers, their staff and senior public servants will be allowed by flawed ethics rules to be involved in policy-making processes that help their own financial interests, and will be allowed to use government property for their own purposes;
• secret, unethical lobbying will still be legal, and many ministerial staff will be allowed to become lobbyists too soon after they leave their position;
• the new ban on secret donations to politicians will not be effectively enforced (because Canada is not complying with an international agreement it signed);
• the public will still not be allowed to file ethics complaints against politicians (even though politicians are the public's employees);
• the Prime Minister and Cabinet will still be able to appoint party loyalists and cronies to more than 2,000 key law enforcement positions without any effective review or parliamentary approval process;
• government institutions will be allowed to keep secret information the public has a clear right to know because of loopholes in the Access to Information Act;
• secret funds like the Adscam fund will not be effectively banned, and politicians and officials will not have to provide detailed receipts to ensure expenses are justifiable;
• federal government institutions will still not be required to consult with Canadians in a meaningful way before making most significant decisions;
• citizens will still face very high barriers to banding together into watchdog groups that have the resources to match the resources of industry sector lobby groups (For details, go to Democracy Watch's Citizen Association Campaign webpage);
• secret rulings will still be possible by the ethics watchdog for the Prime Minister, Cabinet ministers, ministerial staff and senior public servants;
• the identities of politicians, political staff, Cabinet appointees and public servants who are guilty of wrongdoing will often be kept secret;
• the Information Commissioner, Conflict of Interest Ethics Commissioner, Auditor General, Procurement Auditor, and Public Sector Integrity Commissioner will lack key powers needed to ensure everyone in the government follows the rules, which will delay accountability for years as cases of violations are processed through courts;
• penalties for unethical, secretive and wasteful activities (especially by politicians) will still be too low to discourage these activities (on average, the maximum penalty will only be a fine of $5,000), and;
• whistleblowers who are not public servants will not be effectively protected from retaliation, and no whistleblowers will receive compensation adequate to seek another job (even if the whistleblowing process leaves them completely alienated from all their co-workers).

Very briefly, Democracy Watch's position is that abolishing the Senate and increasing House of Commons seats in every province except Ontario and Quebec would most effectively ensure regional representation in the federal government, without the problems of a transition to a new Senate and legislative gridlock that other Senate reform proposals create, and with fewer problems in the area of representation by population compared to other Senate reform proposals.

3. Changes Needed to Bill C-2 (the FAA) to Ensure Honesty, Ethics, Openness, Representation, and Waste-Prevention

• a reference to the part of the FAA to which the proposed change refers;
• the number for the exact section, subsection and/or clause in each existing or proposed Act that is proposed to be added to, changed or deleted;
• the number for the exact section, subsection and/or clause in the FAA that contains the measure that is proposed to be changed;
• an explanation of the effect of the current or proposed measure, and;
• an explanation of why the current or proposed measure needs to be changed.

(a) Empower citizens in clearly needed ways in their day-to-day relations with the federal government by:

• adding measures to the FAA that will establish (using the very low-cost, effective method that has worked very well in the U.S.) broad-based, well-resourced, democratically structured citizen watchdog groups for airlines, banks and insurance companies, telecommunication companies, and for investors in publicly traded companies, groups that will represent citizen interests in government policy-making processes concerning these industry sectors and will help ensure regulatory agencies enforce laws that apply to these industry sectors (For details, go to Democracy Watch's Citizen Association Campaign webpage), and;
• adding to the FAA a "Meaningful Public Consultation Act" to require government institutions to give Canadians a strong, direct and regular say in government policy-making processes (as in Sweden), which will decrease the undemocratic, unethical influence of high-powered lobbyists.

(b) Ensure honesty in politics, and penalize politicians and public officials who are dishonest:

• by putting back in the "Conflict of Interest Act" section of the Federal Accountability Act (Bill C-2 - FAA) the key rule that requires public office holders to "act with honesty" because it is the only general measure that requires senior politicians, their staff, and senior public servants be truthful with the public and the media (NOTE: the rule is in subsection 3(1) of the current Conflict of Interest and Post-Employment Code for Public Office Holders (the Code-- See link to the Code on the following webpage: http://www.parl.gc.ca/oec/en/public_office_holders/conflict_of_interest) -- incredibly, the government proposes in the FAA to repeal this key rule, one of the most unethical actions so far of the new Conservative government); 
• by adding a measure to the Federal Accountability Act (FAA) that prohibits false statements by all politicians, political staff, appointees and public servant with high fines as the penalty for any political leader and party that breaks election promises (unless the proposed new Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner decides that emergency conditions force the promise-breaking), and high fines as the penalty for anyone who misleads voters in between elections (NOTE: such an "honesty-in-government" system has been partially proposed by the NDP), and;
• by adding a measure to the FAA requiring MPs who switch parties between elections to resign and run in a by-election (as the NDP has partially proposed) unless their party leader has been found guilty of dishonest or unethical actions and has not resigned.

(c) Also do not allow the repeal of the following key ethics rules in the "Conflict of Interest Act" section of the Federal Accountability Act (FAA) by adding to the FAA:

• the rule that requires arranging private affairs in a manner that "will prevent real, potential or apparent conflicts of interest from arising" and requires resolving all conflicts of interest "in favour of the public interest" (subsection 3(5) of current Conflict of Interest and Post-Employment Code for Public Office Holders (the Code));
• the rule that requires making decisions "with regard to the merits of each case" (subsection 3(3) of the current Code);
• the rule that prohibits use of government property for anything other than officially approved activities (subsection 3(9) of current Code), and;
• the rule that requires public office holders to "take care to avoid being placed or the appearance of being placed under an obligation to any person or organization that might profit from special consideration on the part of the public office holder" (subsection 22(1) of the current Code).

(d) Force the Conservatives to keep their election promises concerning ethics rules for senior politicians, their staff, and senior public servants by, in the "Conflict of Interest Act" section of the Federal Accountability Act (FAA):

• removing the definition of "private interest" in subsection 2(1) of the proposed Conflict of Interest Act to prevent ministers from voting on matters connected with their business interests (NOTE: the Conservatives promised in the election to "Close the loopholes that allow ministers to vote on matters connected with their business interests");
• eliminating the two-tier ethics rules system and applying the same rules to all Cabinet ministers, ministerial staff, parliamentary secretaries, and senior public servants (NOTE: the Conservatives promised to "Make part-time or non-remunerated ministerial advisers subject to the Ethics Code" but instead have maintained stricter rules by, in the definitions section of the Conflict of Interest Act, listing specific "reporting public office holders" who must follow more ethics rules than all "public office holders" (and this definition exempts many part-time and unpaid ministerial advisers from many of the ethics rules));
• deleting section 38 of the proposed Conflict of Interest Act that allows ministers to exempt any ministerial staffperson from the key post-employment rules 35 to 37 (which contain the five-year ban on lobbying), and attempts to prohibit anyone from challenging the exemption decision in court;
• adding to subsection 44(1) of the proposed Conflict of Interest Act (and subsection 3(8) of the proposed Federal Accountability Act) the right that any member of the public or organization may file a complaint with the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner (not just members of the Senate or House of Commons) to end, finally, the denial of the fundamental Charter of Rights and Freedoms-protected right of voters to complain about their employees -- and correspondingly deleting the very insulting and ethics-enforcement-weakening subsections 44(4) to (8) of the proposed Conflict of Interest Act (which only allow politicians to file complaints, and which put up barriers to the public submitting information to a politician with the request that it be filed as a complaint -- NOTE: the Conservatives' election promise was to "allow members of the public -- not just politicians -- to make complaints to the Ethics Commissioner"), and;
• increasing the penalty set out in section 52 of the proposed Conflict of Interest Act from a fine of up to $500 to a fine of up to $200,000 (to make the penalty meaningful and to match the penalty for violating the proposed Lobbying Act), and by applying the penalties to violations of any section in the Conflict of Interest Act (not just the six (6) sections currently proposed), and by eliminating subsection 53(3) which sets out criteria for determining penalties that are too generous and thereby greatly reduce the likelihood that any public office holder will ever be penalized, and by deleting section 63 which bars the police from proceeding with a charge for violating the Conflict of Interest Act (NOTE: the Conservatives' election promise was to "Give the Ethics Commissioner the power to fine violators").

(e) Other changes needed in the "Conflict of Interest Act" section (section 2) of the Federal Accountability Act (FAA):

• add a rule that requires public disclosure of the gifts, the circumstances under which the gifts were given, and the identity of any person or organization giving a public office holder or a member of his or her family gifts which, in combined annual value, total more than $1,000 (NOTE: under section 23 of the proposed Conflict of Interest Act, public disclosure is only required for a gift worth more than $200, which leaves a loophole that allows a public office holder to receive, in secret from any person or organization, an unlimited number of gifts annually each worth $199);
• change subsections 25(2) and (3) of the proposed Conflict of Interest Act to require that the "public declaration" of the each public office holder must be made within 60 days (not the proposed 120 days, which is much too long) and must include disclosure of certain assets and all liabilities of $5,000 or more (not the proposed $10,000 or more, which is much to high a threshold);
• change subsection 25(4) of the proposed Conflict of Interest Act to require that the "public declaration" of the outside activities of each public office holder must be made within 60 days (not the proposed 120 days, which is a much too long period of secrecy for this key information);
• change subsection 25(1) of the proposed Conflict of Interest Act to require that the "summary statement" of each public office holder be signed and submitted to the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner within 60 days of appointment (not the proposed 120 days, which is a much too long period of secrecy for this key information);
• change subsections 27(1) and (2) of the proposed Conflict of Interest Act to require that the divestment or placement in a blind trust of the "controlled assets" of each public office holder be completed within 60 days of appointment or receipt of the asset (not the proposed 120 days, which is a much too long period to allow public office holders to continue to control these assets);
• add to section 43 of the proposed Conflict of Interest Act a requirement that, whenever the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner gives confidential advice to the Prime Minister or a public office holder, the Commissioner must issue a public bulletin setting out (without identifying the public office holder) what questions were asked and what advice was given in terms of how the rules in the Conflict of Interest Act apply to the situation about which questions were asked (and also add this requirement to issue a public bulletin also to section 85(b) of the Parliament of Canada Act (which is amended by section 28 of the Federal Accountability Act)), and;
• change subsections 45(3) and (4) of the proposed Conflict of Interest Act to require that, if the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner initiates on his or her own an examination of a public office holder's actions because of a reasonable belief that the office holder has violated the ethics rules, the Commissioner must always provide to the Prime Minister a copy of the examination report, and must also make the report public.

(f) Other changes needed to the ethics enforcement sections of the Federal Accountability Act (FAA):

• add a section to the proposed Conflict of Interest Act to require the new Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner to continue investigations that are ongoing but not completed by the current Senate Ethics Officer or the current Ethics Commissioner; 
• delete from the Federal Accountability Act (FAA) subsections 122(e) (re: the Senate Ethics Officer) and (f) (re: the Ethics Commissioner) as these subsections state that these two positions will continue to exist, in direct contradiction to section 28 of the FAA which creates a new Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner (through new subsections 81(1) and (3) to the Parliament of Canada Act);
• delete section 3(1) of the FAA because it requires that everyone currently working in the offices of the Senate Ethics Officer and the Ethics Commissioner will keep their jobs in new positions in the proposed new office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner (NOTE: many of the senior staff in the office of the Ethics Commissioner were found to be biased and incompetent in a July 2004 Federal Court ruling, and there has also been clear evidence made public of other very inappropriate behaviour by these same staff people -- the new Commissioner should therefore have the power to retain or dismiss current staff);
• delete, in sections 5 and 38 of the FAA, the mention of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, to end the accountability-undermining protection of the proposed new Commissioner and ensure that all decisions of the Commissioner can be challenged in Federal Court (and, if the FAA is amended to retain a separate Senate Ethics Officer, delete mention of the Officer in section 5 of the FAA);
• change proposed subsections 86(1), (3) and (5) of the Parliament of Canada Act (which is amended by section 28 of the FAA) to ensure that, when enforcing Senate ethics rules, the proposed new Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner will have effective independence (NOTE: currently, under the Senate Ethics Code , the new Commissioner would have no independence and almost every decision and action of the Commissioner would be under the control of a committee of senators (including the decision to launch investigations into alleged violations of the Senate Ethics Code));
• change proposed subsections 87(1), (3) and (5) of the Parliament of Canada Act (which is amended by section 28 of the FAA) to ensure that, when enforcing House of Commons ethics rules, the proposed new Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner will have effective independence (NOTE: currently, under the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons (the MPs Code ), the new Commissioner has effective independence but there is currently no legal prohibition on the House of Commons changing the MPs Code to place the Commissioner completely under the control of a committee of MPs (in the same way the Senate Ethics Officer is under the control of a committee of senators);
• change proposed new subsections 41.1(3) and 41.1(6) of the Parliament of Canada Act (as added by section 99 of the FAA) to increase the fines for taking secret donations from a trust fund or violating an order to terminate a secret trust fund to $50,000 to $100,000 (currently, the subsection proposes ridiculously low penalties of $500 to $2,000);
• add a new measure to the FAA that adds to the proposed new Conflict of Interest Act, and the Parliament of Canada Act , a requirement that the new Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner conduct a random audit (without advance notice) of the assets and liabilities of Cabinet ministers, their staff, MPs, senators, and other senior public officials to ensure that their financial statements are accurate (this audit should be conducted in conjunction with the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (Fintrac) (See below in part (i) "Canada Elections Act" changes needed to comply with international convention requirements that involve Fintrac), and;
• make the Senate Ethics Code and the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons(the MPs Code) into laws and before doing so close the many loopholes in both codes (there are many more loopholes in the Senate Ethics Code).

(g) Changes needed to the Federal Accountability Act (FAA) that apply to all the new "ethics" watchdogs:

• add the proposed subsection 81(2) of the Parliament of Canada Act (as amended by section 28 of the FAA) that requires the proposed new Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner to have judicial or relevant legal enforcement experience also to the sections addressing the appointment of the proposed new Commissioner of Lobbying (section 68 of the FAA which amends section 4.1 of the proposed Lobbying Act), and the appointment of the proposed new Public Sector Integrity Commissioner (section 39 of the proposed Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act) -- NOTE: both these positions involve making rulings and these two commissioners should therefore also have judicial or relevant legal enforcement experience.

(h) Changes needed to the Federal Accountability Act (FAA) that apply to all Officers of Parliament and other Cabinet appointees:

• change the proposed subsections 81(1) and (3) of the Parliament of Canada Act (as amended by section 28 of the FAA) that state that the proposed new Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner be appointed by the Governor in Council after consultation with the leader of every recognized party in the House of Commons and Senate and approval by secret-ballot resolution of the House and Senate to require, instead, that the leader of every recognized party (or, at least, a majority of the leaders) must approve the Governor in Council's nominee for Commissioner and, if any one of them reject the nominee, they must explain publicly the reason for their rejection OR, instead, to require that the nominee be approved by a resolution passed by two-thirds majority in the House and Senate;
• make the same change proposed above to the appointment process proposed in the FAA for every other Officer of Parliament or similar watchdog agency (NOTE: the change needs to be made to section 68 of the FAA which establishes the appointment process for the new Commissioner of Lobbying, and to section 109(1) of the FAA which establishes the appointment process for the Information Commissioner, and to subsection 110(1) of the FAA which establishes the appointment process for the Auditor General, and to section 111 of the FAA which changes the appointment process for the Chief Electoral Officer, and to subsection 112(1) of the FAA which establishes the appointment process for the Commissioner of Official Languages, and to section 119 of the FAA which establishes the appointment process for the Parliamentary Budget Officer, and to section 120 of the FAA which establishes the appointment process for the Privacy Commissioner, and to section 121 of the FAA which establishes the appointment process for the proposed new Public Sector Integrity Commissioner, and to section 228 of the FAA which establishes the appointment process for the proposed new Public Appointments Commission, and to section 309 of the FAA which establishes the appointment process for the proposed new Procurement Auditor);
• similar to the Auditor General's single, non-repeatable 10-year term of office (and the Privacy Commissioner's, Director of Public Prosecutions' and Commissioner of Official Languages' single, non-repeatable seven-year terms of office), change proposed subsection 81(4) of the Parliament of Canada Act (as amended by section 28 of the FAA) so that the proposed new Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner will only be allowed to serve one seven-year term (the subsection proposes that the Commissioner could serve more than one term, which causes the danger that the Commissioner will attempt to please the government in order to keep their job);
• make the same change proposed above for the same reason to ensure only one multi-year term for the Commissioner of Lobbying (set out in subsection 4.1(4) of the proposed Lobbying Act (as amended by section 68 of the FAA)), and for the Information Commissioner (set out in subsection 54(2) of the Access to Information Act (as amended by subsection 109(1) of the FAA)), and for the Chief Electoral Officer (as set out in section 13 of the Canada Elections Act (as amended by section 113 of the FAA)), and for the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner (as set out in section 39(3) of the proposed Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act), and for the Parliamentary Budget Officer (set out in proposed new subsection 79.1(2) of the Parliament of Canada Act (as added by section 119 of the FAA) -- the Officer also needs to be made independent of Cabinet by giving the Officer security of tenure (currently, the FAA proposes that the Cabinet could dismiss the Officer without any cause for doing so)), and for the proposed new Procurement Auditor (as set out in proposed new subsection 22.1(1) of the Department of Public Works and Government Services Act(as added by section 309 of the FAA)), and;
• add to the FAA new measures that make changes similar to those proposed above for appointments and terms for all federal agencies, boards, courts, commissions and tribunals involved in law enforcement (e.g. the Supreme Court of Canada, the Federal Court of Canada, the Public Service Commission, the Public Service Staffing Tribunal, the Financial Consumer Commissioner, the Canada Transportation Safety Board, the Immigration and Refugee Board etc.).

(i) Changes needed to the "Canada Elections Act" section of the Federal Accountability Act (FAA):

• extend the proposed new prohibition on accepting gifts or other advantages in proposed section 92.2 of the Elections Act (as amended by section 40 of the FAA) to nomination race candidates and party leadership race candidates;
• delete from proposed subsection 92.2(3) of the Elections Act (as amended by section 40 of the FAA) the loophole that does not require disclosure to the Chief Electoral Officer of gifts or other advantages "made by way of an unconditional, non-discretionary testamentary disposition";
• change proposed subsection 92.2(4) of the Elections Act (as amended by section 40 of the FAA) to require disclosure of gifts and other advantages to the Chief Electoral Officer one week before polling day;
• change proposed subsection 92.5(1) of the Elections Act (as amended by section 40 of the FAA) to require the Chief Electoral Officer to retain the gift disclosure statements for candidates who are elected until the candidate ceases to be an Member of the House of Commons;
• change proposed subsection 92.5(2) of the Elections Act (as amended by section 40 of the FAA) to require the Chief Electoral Officer to make the gift disclosure statement public before polling day;
• change existing clauses 404.2(2)(c) and (d) and 404.2(3)(a) and (b) and subsection 404.2(5) and proposed clauses 404.2(2.1)(c) and (d) of the Elections Act (as amended by section 44 of the FAA) and to ensure that contribution limits apply to all donations of goods, services and funds (these sections currently allow unlimited donations by nomination contestants and election candidates to riding associations, parties and their own nomination race campaigns, and should instead only allow unlimited donations of the leftover campaign funds from nomination races and election campaigns to riding associations and parties); 
• add a measure to the Elections Act that requires the disclosure of all donations and loans made to candidates, riding associations, and parties before polling day (NOTE: to match the existing requirement that candidates in party leadership campaigns must disclose donations made to them before the leadership election process takes place);
• add limits on spending on leadership campaigns, and restrict loans to parties, nomination race candidates, election candidates and party leadership candidates so that corporations, unions and other wealthy interests cannot use loans to influence the government and politicians (to fulfill the Conservatives' vague election pledge to ensure party leadership and nomination races are "fair, transparent, and democratic");
• add a requirement to disclose of the identity of each individual donor's employer (as in the U.S.) and direct organizational affiliations to the Chief Electoral Officer to ensure that businesses, unions and other organizations are not funnelling donations through individuals to candidates and parties;
• add donation limits and disclosure requirements for "volunteer labour" donated to parties and candidates during nomination race, election and party leadership campaigns, to close this existing secret donations loophole (the Conservatives have only pledged to ban secret money and gift donations);
• add, as proposed by the federal Department of Finance, a requirement that federal politicians, their staff, Cabinet appointees and any government employees with decision-making power are placed on the anti-corruption watch list of the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (Fintrac) so that their bank accounts can be tracked for suspicious transactions;
• add a measure lowering the public funding of political parties from $1.75 per vote received to $0.75 per vote received (to ensure that in order to prosper parties need to have active, ongoing support of a broad base of individuals) and ensure riding associations receive a fair share of this funding (to reduce the control that the central executive of each party has over the associations);
• add a measure giving voters the right to "refuse" their ballot (as is legal in Ontario elections) so that voters who do not support any candidate in their riding can vote for "none of the above" and have their voted counted separately from spoiled ballots (and require Elections Canada to feature this right in all of their election information, promotion and advertising materials);
• fix election dates and give the Auditor General the power to review and prohibit partisan government advertising for six-months before the election date;
• require poll clerks and returning officers to ensure that each person is actually qualified to vote (to address the examples cited by observers across the country that people are voting twice, and that non-citizens are voting);
• require the media to give equal prominence to all numbers in survey result reports (to end the misleading hype of polls seen in the past few elections), and;
• require Elections Canada to conduct more door-to-door enumeration audits to correct errors in the current permanent voters list.

(j) Force the Conservatives to keep their election promise to end secret lobbying by, in the "Lobbying Act" section of the Federal Accountability Act (FAA):

• adding a measure to the "Lobbying Act" section of the FAA requiring ministers, ministerial staff, and senior public servants in all government institutions to register in the Lobbyist Registry all communications with anyone outside of the federal government attempting to influence their decisions or actions, and to categorize those contacting these senior officials for this reason as "registered lobbyists" required to comply with all the requirements of the proposed Lobbying Act and the Lobbyists' Code of Conduct (NOTE: the Conservatives election promise was to "Require ministers and senior government officials to record their contacts with lobbyists").

(k) Other changes needed to the "Lobbying Act" section of the Federal Accountability Act (FAA):

• change proposed clause 7(3)(f.1)(i) of the Lobbying Act (as amended by subsection 70(2) of the FAA) to require that for-profit corporations register all employees engaged in lobbying (currently, the Act's requirements are unfair because for-profit corporations are required to register on the on-line Lobbyist Registry only employees engaged in lobbying as a "significant part" of their job (ie. more than 20% of their working hours) while non-profit organizations are required to register all employees engaged in lobbying -- in addition, this loophole means that many for-profit corporate lobbyists do not have to follow the ethics rules in the Lobbyists' Code of Conduct);
• change (in similar ways and for similar reasons as the proposal made immediately above) proposed new clause 10.11(1)(c) of the Lobbying Act (as added by section 75 of the FAA) to extend the five-year ban on lobbying to all former senior public office holders who become employees of corporations (the proposed new clause would allow former senior public office holders to lobby up to 20% of their time as an employee of a corporation, a huge loophole that will definitely be exploited to avoid the five-year ban);
• delete proposed new subsection 10.11(2) of the Lobbying Act (as added by section 75 of the FAA) that exempts "employment exchange program" participants from the the five-year ban on senior public office holders becoming lobbyists because it creates a huge loophole in the five-year ban that will definitely be exploited;
• change (for similar reasons as the proposal made immediately above) proposed new subsection 10(3) of the Lobbying Act (as added by section 75 of the FAA) so that the Commissioner of Lobbyists will not have the power to exempt the listed types of senior public office holders from the five-year ban on lobbying -- instead give the Commissioner only the power to reduce the time period of the ban on lobbying to no less than two years;
• add a new measure to the FAA that changes the Lobbying Act to ban MPs, senators and their staff from becoming lobbyists for one year after leaving office;
• add a new measure to the FAA that changes the Lobbying Act to (as the NDP has proposed) clearly ban lobbyists from working directly or indirectly with government, and in senior campaign positions (Democracy Watch's position is that a rule in the Lobbyists' Code of Conduct already bans lobbyists from working in these positions, but a clear, specific rule is also needed);
• add a measure to the FAA (as the NDP has partially proposed) to require lobbyists to disclose on the on-line, searchable Lobbyist Registry how much they spend on each lobbying campaign; 
• add a measure to the FAA (as the NDP has proposed) to require lobbyists to disclose on the Lobbyist Registry their past work with any government, political party or candidate;
• delete proposed new subsection 10(1.1) of the Lobbying Act (as added by subsection 77(1) of the FAA) because it gives the Commissioner of Lobbying too much power to refuse to conduct (and to end) an investigation for vague, unjustifiable reasons;
• change section 14 of the Lobbying Act (as amended by section 80 of the FAA) to establish a mandatory minimum fine of $25,000 for violating the Lobbying Act (currently, section 14 contains only maximum limits on fines for violations);
• change proposed new section 14.02 of the Lobbying Act (as added by section 80 of the FAA) to require the Commissioner of Lobbying to make public the identity of anyone punished by the Commissioner under section 14.01 of the Lobbying Act (currently, section 14.02 gives the Commissioner the power to keep the identity of the person secret);
• delete section 84 of the FAA because it requires that everyone currently working in the offices of the Registrar of Lobbyists will keep their jobs in new positions in the proposed new office of the Commissioner of Lobbying (given the very weak record of enforcement of the federal lobbying law by the Registrar's office since summer 2004, the Commissioner should have the power to hire all new staff if he or she wants to do so); 
• change section 85 of the FAA to require the new Commissioner of Lobbying to continue investigations that are ongoing but not completed by the Registrar of Lobbyists (currently, section 85 gives the Commissioner the power to end ongoing investigations -- Democracy Watch has been waiting for 3-5 years for rulings on investigations on 8 ethics complaints, and the passage of the FAA should not create the possibility that these complaints will never be ruled on);
• delete subsection 88(2) of the FAA because it creates a huge loophole in the five-year ban on senior public office holders becoming lobbyists (the subsection allows Assistant Deputy Ministers to avoid the ban as long as they leave government and become lobbyists within six (6) months after the FAA comes into force); 
• delete section 88.11 of the FAA because it also creates a huge loophole in the five-year ban on senior public office holders becoming lobbyists (the section allows “transition team” members to obtain an exemption from the ban), and;
• change section 89 of the FAA (which adds section 16.2 to the Access to Information Act) to ensure the Commissioner is required to disclose documents obtained during investigations if the Commissioner's decision is challenged in court.

(l) Changes needed to the "Public Service Employment Act" (PSEA) section of the Federal Accountability Act (FAA):

• change proposed new section 127.1 of the PSEA (as added by section 106 of the FAA) to instead implement recommendations 6 and 12 of the Gomery Commission to give the Public Service Commission the power to select Deputy Ministers (and other senior public servants currently selected by Cabinet) through a competitive, merit-based process and to protect them from dismissal for any reason other than cause (NOTE: the recommendations were made to help ensure professionalism and independence from Cabinet control of the people in these key senior positions) -- OR, if the proposed new Public Appointments Commission is made independent of Cabinet, rules-based, and appointed through a parliamentary process, give it the power to appoint Deputy Ministers and other senior public servants currently selected by Cabinet;
• add a new measure to the FAA to amend sections 17-19 and 66 to 73 of the PSEA to give an entity separate from the Public Service Commission the power to do audits and investigations of the Commission, and public service appointments and other public service hiring operations generally, and require that entity to issue public reports of the audits (NOTE: currently, the Public Service Commission is in a conflict of interest because it audits and investigates its own operations -- the proposed new Public Sector Integrity Commissioner is very likely the best entity for this public service audit function OR, if it is made independent of Cabinet, rules-based, and appointed through a parliamentary process, the proposed new Public Appointments Commission could also be the auditor);
• add a new measure to the FAA to amend subsection 30(4) of the PSEA to require the Public Service Commission to consider more than one person for an appointment in order for the appointment to be considered to have been made on the basis of merit;
• add a new measure to the FAA to amend subsection 33 of the PSEA to require the Public Service Commission to use an advertised appointment process for every appointment;
• add a new measure to the FAA to amend subsection 36 of the PSEA to require the Public Service Commission to use a specific, well-established, effective assessment process for every appointment;
• change section 38 of the PSEA (instead of amending it very slightly as section 102 of the FAA does) because it allows the Public Service Commission to avoid merit requirements for many appointments (only allow non-merit based appointments under the conditions set out in section 40, subsections 41(1) and (4), of the PSEA), and;
• delete section 100 of the FAA because it does not amend in any way the section in the PSEA (paragraph 22(2)(a)) it claims to amend.

(m) Force the Conservatives to keep their election promise to create a "Public Appointments Commission" that will ensure Cabinet appointments are merit-based by, in the Federal Accountability Act (FAA):

• deleting proposed new section 1.1 of the Salaries Act (as added by section 228 of the FAA) because it does not require Cabinet to establish a Public Appointments Commission (it only allows Cabinet to create the Commission) and it puts the Commission entirely under the control of Cabinet (which means the Commission would lack the independence to do anything effective to end patronage (which is the reason the Conservatives claim the Commission is being created)), and;
• adding to the FAA new measures that set out a new "Public Appointments Commission Act" that require the creation of the Commission, and that contain all the same appointment and operations rules as exist for Officers of Parliament, including specific rules that ensure the Commission is independent of Cabinet and Commission members are only appointed with the approval of opposition party leaders, and that the Commission is required to establish and maintain merit-based requirements for appointments, and to publicize available appointment positions, and to conduct fair evaluations of applicants (NOTE: the Conservatives election promise was to "Establish a Public Appointments Commission to set merit-based requirements for appointments to government boards, commissions and agencies, to ensure that competitions for posts are widely publicized and fairly conducted" -- alternately, add measures to the FAA to give the proposed new Public Sector Integrity Commissioner the power to fulfill the above responsibilities of the Public Appointments Commission);
• adding a new measure to the FAA to, as the Gomery Commission recommended (in recommendations 6 and 12) to give the Public Appointments Commission the power to appoint Deputy Ministers (and other senior public servants currently selected by Cabinet) through a competitive, merit-based process and to protect them from dismissal for any reason other than cause (OR, if the Public Appointments Commission is not made independent of Cabinet, rules-based, and appointed through a parliamentary process and, instead, the Public Service Commission is changed in these ways, amend the Public Service Employment Act to give the Public Service Commission the power to select Deputy Ministers);
• adding to the FAA new measures to require approval by a majority of opposition party leaders for appointees to all federal agencies, boards, courts, commissions and tribunals involved in law enforcement (e.g. the Supreme Court of Canada, the Federal Court of Canada, the Public Service Commission, the Public Service Staffing Tribunal, the Financial Consumer Commissioner, the Canada Transportation Safety Board, the Immigration and Refugee Board etc.) and ensure that appointees cannot serve more than one term unless a second term is approved by a majority of opposition party leaders.

(n) Force the Conservatives to keep their election promises to make the federal government more transparent in key ways by, in the "Access to Information Act" (ATI Act) section of the Federal Accountability Act (FAA):

• adding a new measure to change the ATI Act to "Give the Information Commissioner the power to order the release of information" (as the Conservatives promised, and as the information commissioners in Ontario, B.C. and Quebec have);
• adding a new measure to expand the ATI Act to all "all Crown corporations, Officers of Parliament, foundations, and organizations that spend taxpayers' money or perform public functions" (as the Conservatives promised); 
• adding a measure to change the ATI Act so as to "Subject the exclusion of Cabinet confidences to review by the Information Commissioner" (as the Conservatives promised);
• adding a measure to change the ATI Act to "Oblige public officials to create the records necessary to document their actions and decisions" (as the Conservatives promised);
• adding a measure to change the ATI Act to "Provide a general public interest override for all exemptions, so that the public interest is put before the secrecy of the government" (as the Conservatives promised);
• adding a measure to change the ATI Act to "Ensure that all exemptions from the disclosure of government information are justified only on the basis of the harm or injury that would result from disclosure, not blanket exemption rules"(as the Conservatives promised), and;
• adding a measure to change the ATI Act to "Ensure that the disclosure requirements of the Access to Information Act cannot be circumvented by secrecy provisions in other federal acts, while respecting the confidentiality of national security and the privacy of personal information" (as the Conservatives also promised).

(o) Other changes needed to the "Access to Information Act" (ATI Act) section of the Federal Accountability Act (FAA):

• add to the FAA a new measure that changes the ATI Act by requiring that all government institutions, including all "foundations, and organizations that spend taxpayers' money or perform public functions" (the Conservatives promised to extend the coverage of the ATI Act to these entities), to establish a system for classifying all records as they are created as either "disclosable" or "covered by an exemption" and to place a list every three months of all records created in each category on a central searchable website, and to clearly designate responsibility for maintaining this information management system to specific public servants (and, of course, provide all government institutions with funding to establish and maintain such a system);
• add to the FAA a new measure (as the Information Commissioner has recommended, and as exists in some provinces) that changes all the mandatory exemptions and exclusions in the ATI Act to discretionary exemptions, and that changes the section 69 ATI Act exclusion (that prevents the release of Cabinet confidences for 20 years) to a 10-year long exemption that, as in Ontario, applies only to defined records that "reveal the substance of deliberations of Cabinet" and that ensures all other Cabinet-related records (including records currently withheld under the section 21 ATI Act (advice and recommendations) exemption) are explicitly subject to the right of access;
• add to the FAA a new measure that amends the ATI Act by giving the Information Commissioner the power to penalize violators of the ATI Act with high fines, suspensions and firings, including for failing to maintain the information management system proposed above, and for failing to meet deadlines for disclosure of records (and, of course provide the Information Commissioner with the powers and resources needed to carry out this role);
• change proposed new sections 16.1 and 16.3 of the ATI Act (as added by sections 146 and 147 of the FAA) and proposed new section 22.1 of the Privacy Act (as added by section 183 of the FAA) to ensure that, if any of the five Officers of Parliament's rulings are challenged in court, that documents relating to their investigation could be made public through that court proceeding;
• add a new measure to the FAA that changes the ATI Act to eliminate the $5 fee for filing a request for a record (given that it is an unnecessary and unjustifiable barrier to access to information, and that processing the payment of the fee results in administrative costs for the federal government that exceed the fee);
• add a new measure to the FAA that changes the ATI Act to increase the current five-hour free records search time to 10 hours (given the lack of efficient, accessible information management systems in many government institutions);
• add a new measure to the FAA that changes the ATI Act to set one fee for copying records for all government institutions at a level no higher than the actual copying costs, and to require institutions to waive the copying costs if they will cause financial hardship to the requester, and;
• delete proposed new subsection 16.5(4) of the Financial Administration Act (as added by section 261 of the FAA) because it requires that the decision of the Treasury Board reviewing a disagreement between a minister and deputy on whether spending rules are being followed be kept secret for 20 years.

(p) Force the Conservatives to keep their election promise to ensure "truth-in-budgetting" by, in the Federal Accountability Act (FAA):

• making the proposed new Parliamentary Budget Officer (set out in proposed new subsection 79.1(2) of the Parliament of Canada Act (as added by section 119 of the FAA) independent of Cabinet by giving the Officer security of tenure (currently, the FAA proposes that the Cabinet could dismiss the Officer without any cause for doing so -- the Conservatives promised to "Create an independent Parliamentary Budget Office"));
• deleting or at least changing proposed new clause 79.3(2)(b) and of the Parliament of Canada Act (as added by section 119 of the FAA) to ensure that government officials cannot hide up-to-date financial data by labelling the data a "Cabinet confidence" (the Conservatives promised to "Require government departments and agencies . . . to provide accurate, timely information to the Parliamentary Budget Office to ensure it has the information it needs to provide accurate analyses to Parliament"), and;
• ensure the Conservatives' promised changes to the Access to Information Act (ATI Act -- as set out in the section above) are made to ensure that the Information Commissioner can override abuses of exemptions by government officials trying to hide key information that the Parliamentary Budget Officer needs to do their job (again, the Conservatives promised to "Require government departments and agencies" to provide this information to the Officer).

(q) Changes needed to the "Director of Public Prosecutions Act" section of the Federal Accountability Act (FAA):

• delete section 15 of the proposed new Director of Public Prosecutions Act (which is created by section 123 of the FAA) because it undermines the whole purpose of the creating the Director as a prosecutor independent of Cabinet (NOTE: section 15 gives the Attorney General of Canada the power to take over any prosecution from the Director).

(r) Force the Conservatives to keep their election promise to publish the results of all "public opinion research" by, in the Federal Accountability Act (FAA):

• changing proposed new section 15.1 of the Library and Archives of Canada Act (as added by section 180 of the FAA) to require all government institutions (including all Crown corporations, Officers of Parliament, foundations, and organizations that spend taxpayers' money or perform public functions) to file within six months of completion a copy of any report of public opinion research with the Librarian and Archivist (NOTE: the Conservatives promised to "Ensure that all government public opinion research is automatically published within six months of the completion of the project" -- currently, proposed new section 15.1 only requires some government institutions to file a copy of research conducted by an outside company, which means much research will remain secret).

(s) Force the Conservatives to keep their election promises to protect all "whistleblowers" by, in the Federal Accountability Act (FAA):

• changing the title of the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act (PSDPA) to the Public Sector Wrongdoing Disclosure Protection Act (PSWDPA);
• changing the definition of "public sector" in section 2 of the PSDPA to include all government or quasi-governmental institutions (including all politicians' offices, all Crown corporations, all Officers of Parliament, all foundations, and all organizations that spend taxpayers' money or perform public functions), and by adding a new measure to the FAA that changes section 53 of the PSDPA to require Cabinet to apply the PSDPA to all the above listed federal government institutions and all new institutions as they are created (NOTE: these provisions currently exempt politicians' offices and quasi-governmental organizations and do not require Cabinet to designate new institutions as covered by the Act -- the Conservatives' election promise was to "Remove the government's ability to exempt Crown corporations and other bodies from the Act"); 
• changing the definition of "reprisal" in section 2 of the PSDPA to include reprisals against non-public servants, and by changing proposed new section 19 of the PSDPA (as changed by section 201 of the FAA) to prohibit reprisals against any whistleblower (NOTE: currently, the prohibition only applies to "public servants" -- the Conservatives' promise was to "Ensure that all Canadians who report government wrongdoing are protected, not just public servants");
• deleting proposed new subsection 42.1(3) of the PSDPA (as added by section 215 of the FAA) because it contradicts section 19 of the PSDPA by exempting public sector employers from the prohibition of reprisals against employees;
• deleting section 55 of the PSDPA (as changed by section 222 of the FAA) and section 57 of the PSDPA (as changed by section 224 of the FAA) and sections 58 and 58.1 of the PSDPA (as changed by section 225 of the FAA) because these three provisions prohibit (under the Access to Information Act , the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act , and the Privacy Act ) the disclosure of information about wrongdoing revealed by whistleblowers, and; add a new measure to the FAA that changes the PSDPA to require the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner to disclose rulings on investigations into wrongdoing within 30 days after the rulings are made (NOTE: the Conservatives' election promise was to "Require the prompt public disclosure of information revealed by whistleblowers, except where national security or the security of individuals is affected").

(t) Other changes needed to the "Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act" (PSDPA) section of the Federal Accountability Act (FAA):

• change proposed new subsection 11(2) of the PSDPA (as added by section 199 of the FAA) to require public disclosure of the identity of the person who has been found to have committed a wrongdoing in all cases;
• add a measure to the FAA to delete section 14.1 of the PSDPA (because it bars public servants from disclosing wrongdoing to the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner in some situations);
• change proposed new clause 21.7(1)(f) of the PSDPA (as added by section 201 of the FAA) to increase the amount that can be awarded for pain and suffering to a whistleblower who has suffered a reprisal from the proposed maximum of $10,000 (which is much too low) to a maximum of $50,000;
• change proposed new subsections 22(h) of the PSDPA (as changed by subsection 202(2) of the FAA), proposed new subsection 26(1) of the PSDPA (as changed by section 204 of the FAA), proposed new section 36 of the PSDPA (as changed by section 208 of the FAA), and proposed new subsection 38(3.1) of the PSDPA (as changed by section 210(3) of the FAA) to give the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner the power to order chief executives to take corrective action, and always require chief executives to report to the Commissioner on corrective actions taken (NOTE: currently, these provisions only give the Commissioner the power to make recommendations, and do not require reports from chief executives on corrective actions taken);
• add a new measure to the FAA that adds a measure to the PSDPA to give the Commissioner the power to penalize any chief executive with a fine, suspension or firing if the chief executive does not comply with the Commissioner's order;
• delete proposed new clause 24(1)(b) of the PSDPA (as changed by section 203 of the FAA) because it gives the Commissioner too much power, without specific criteria, to refuse to deal with a disclosure (NOTE: for example, the clause allows the Commissioner to deem a disclosure not "sufficiently important");
• delete proposed new subsection 27(1) of the PSDPA (as changed by subsection 205(1) of the FAA) to give the Commissioner the right to determine the appropriate time to inform a chief executive of an investigation (NOTE: the current subsection requires the Commissioner to inform a chief executive as soon as an investigation is commenced, which may allow a chief executive to destroy key evidence of wrongdoing);
• add a new measure to the FAA that changes subsection 38(2) of the PSDPA to require the Commissioner to disclose in annual reports the identities of anyone found to have committed wrongdoing, and change clause 49(1)(f) of the PSDPA to allow for this disclosure;
• change proposed new section 42.3 of the PSDPA (as added by section 215 of the FAA) to set a minimum fine for taking a reprisal against a whistleblower of $50,000, and a maximum range of fines from $100,000 to $200,000, and to give the Commissioner the power to fine violators (NOTE: the current proposed fines have no minimum, and the maximum range is $5,000 to $10,000, far too low to discourage employers from taking reprisals -- and as the Commissioner is the judge of whether reprisals have been taken, clearly the Commissioner should also have the power to fine anyone who takes a reprisal), and;
• change proposed new section 53.1 of the PSDPA (as added by section 220 of the FAA) to increase the monetary awards to a maximum of 6 months salary of the whistleblower, if the whistleblower decides that the disclosure of wrongdoing process means that the whistleblower cannot remain in their current workplace.

(u) Changes needed to the "Financial Administration Act" section of the Federal Accountability Act (FAA):

• delete proposed new subsection 16.5(4) of the Financial Administration Act (as added by section 261 of the FAA) because it requires that the decision of the Treasury Board reviewing a disagreement between a minister and deputy on whether spending rules are being followed be kept secret for 20 years;
• add a new measure to the FAA that amends the Financial Administration Act to give the Auditor General the power to review proposed government advertising to determine if the advertising is legitimate or is propaganda for the governing party, and the power either to prohibit party propaganda advertising, or at least to issue a public report on the Auditor General's determination about each advertisement;
• add a new measure to the FAA to change section 118 of the Financial Administration Act to require Crown corporations to apply to court to have the court void any contract signed with a director of the corporation or an entity in which a director has an interest if it is discovered that the director did not disclose their interest to the corporation's board of directors (currently, section 118 only allows the corporation to apply to court, but does not require the corporation to apply to court);
• add a new measure to the FAA to change section 154 of the Financial Administration Act to require Cabinet to suspend or fire any director or officer of a Crown corporation who violates the Act or related regulations or policies and requires Cabinet to report the identity of the violator and the penalty to Parliament (currently, section 154 only allows Cabinet to suspend (but not fire) Crown corporation wrongdoers, and does not require any public report);
• add a new measure to the FAA that changes the Financial Administration Act to give the Auditor General the power to penalize violators of the Financial Administration Act and Treasury Board rules with high fines, suspensions and firings (the Conservatives only promised in their election campaign to give the Ethics Commissioner the power to penalize violators of ethics rules, and to pass "new Criminal Code penalties for fraud involving the misuse of taxpayers' money");
• add a new measure to the FAA that, as the Gomery Commission recommended, changes the Financial Administration Act to ban the creation of any "special reserve" funds unless they are under the control of Treasury Board and covered by an annual, public report, and;
• add a new measure to the FAA that adds to the Financial Administration Act the requirement that everyone in the government submit the actual, detailed receipt (as opposed to payment receipt) for all expenses claimed to prevent unjustified expense claims.

(v) Changes needed to the "Auditor General Act" (AGA) section of the Federal Accountability Act (FAA):

• add a new measure to the FAA to change subsection 14(3) of the AGA to require the Cabinet to order a Crown corporation to provide information to the Auditor General if the corporation has refused to provide the information (currently, the subsection only allows Cabinet to order the corporation), and;
• add a new measure to the FAA giving the Auditor General the power to penalize violators of the Financial Administration Act and Treasury Board rules with fines, suspensions and firings.

(w) Force the Conservatives to keep their promise to appoint a Procurement Auditor by, in the "Department of Public Works and Government Services Act" (DPWGSA) section of the Federal Accountability Act (FAA):

• changing proposed new subsection 22.1(1) of the DPWGSA (as added by section 309 of the FAA) to guarantee the appointment of the proposed new Procurement Auditor and to give the Auditor independence from Cabinet by requiring the Cabinet to appoint a Procurement Auditor, requiring approval by opposition party leaders of the appointment, and giving the Auditor protection from dismissal except for cause (NOTE: currently, the proposed subsection does not require Cabinet to appoint the Auditor, and does not give the Auditor independence from Cabinet nor job security -- the Conservatives promised in the election to "Appoint a Procurement Auditor to ensure that all procurements are fair and transparent, and to address complaints from vendors");
• changing proposed new subsection 22.1(3)(a) of the DPWGSA (as added by section 309 of the FAA) to give the Procurement Auditor the power to audit the procurement practices of all government institutions (NOTE: currently the subsection only gives the Auditor the power to audit departments -- the Conservatives promised in the election to "Appoint a Procurement Auditor to ensure that all procurements are fair and transparent, and to address complaints from vendors");
• changing proposed subsections 22.1(3), 22.2(3), 22.3(1) and 23.1(c) of the DPWGSA (as added by sections 309 and 310 of the FAA) to give the Procurement Auditor the power to order changes to procurement practices at any government institution and to report to Parliament on problems with practices and complaints (NOTE: currently, the subsections only give the Procurement Auditor the power to make non-binding recommendations (which the Cabinet can restrict by regulation), and only require an Annual Report to Parliament that is not required to contain details of procurement practice problems and complaints);
• changing proposed new clause 22.1(3)(d) of the DPWGSA (as added by section 309 of the FAA) to require the Procurement Auditor to provide an alternative dispute resolution process if either party to a contract requests it (currently, the proposed clause on requires the Auditor to provide the process if both parties to a contract request it), and;
• deleting section 317 of the FAA because it gives the Cabinet the power not to implement sections 309 and 310 of the FAA (which establish the Procurement Auditor position) even if the FAA is passed by Parliament.