[Democracy Watch Logo][Op-ed]


Election finance rules democratic
Limiting third-party spending reins in influence

(The following opinion piece about Manitoba's new election finance law, by Aaron Freeman, a Board member of Democracy Watch, was published in The Winnipeg Free Presson August 2, 2000)


As the influence of wealth in setting the agenda of politics becomes ever more apparent, regulating money in politics is central to the quality of Canadian democracy. Manitoba's proposed new amendments to the Elections Finances Act seek to rein in this influence, and should be strongly supported.

The proposed new contribution restrictions would follow the Quebec model, under which corporations, unions and other organizations may not donate to political parties, and individuals can donate no more than $3,000 per year. This system forces parties to broaden their base of support, and prohibits entities that do not vote from trying to use their wealth to influence the democratic process. It also keeps election expenses down, making entry into politics more accessible.

The public already subsidizes parties and candidates by giving tax benefits for contributions. But in essence, this public money is being spent by wealthy donors, who choose which candidates and parties they want to support, and then use public subsidies to further bolster their choice, an inherently undemocratic system that the proposed spending restrictions would ameliorate.

The new law would also put in place other mechanisms to limit the influence of money in politics. Democratic measures that would make electoral politics more accessible, such as contribution limits, may be rendered meaningless if corporations and unions are able to spend unlimited amounts to oppose or support a candidate or party. The bill therefore limits "third-party spending" to a level that restricts the influence of wealthy special interests, while allowing for a reasonable amount political expression.

Exactly how candidate and party expense limits can be circumvented by third parties was illustrated in the 1988 federal election. In that election, business groups spent an estimated $13 million on advertising in support of the free trade deal, while the deal's opponents spent roughly $1 million. Given that only one political party favoured the free trade deal, and that the deal was the key issue of the 1988 election, the pro-trade spending was clearly partisan in nature.

Robert Gabor (Free Press, op-ed, July 15) argues that if we place restrictions on contributions and third-party spending, "the true influences behind elections will move underground." He quotes a former Quebec politician who argues that corporations and unions will simply find ways to evade the provisions. However, neither Gabor nor his source can cite a single example of a corporation or union in Quebec that has found a way to donate significant sums to a political party in that province, and in the 23-year history of the Quebec law, there has been no evidence of this occurring on any meaningful scale.

Any mechanisms to hide political spending under the new provisions would still be available under the current system. And there is little to gain from arguing that because we can't solve all of the problems, we shouldn't try to solve any of them.

Another highly speculative claim Gabor makes is that as long as we have transparency, this will be enough to limit the influence of moneyed interests in our political system.

The United States has an excellent system of disclosure -- far more comprehensive than any jurisdiction in Canada. And yet the only thing this has changed, in the words of one U.S. campaign finance reform advocate, is that "now we know who's mugging us."

Critics of the proposed third-party spending restrictions allege that the provisions are unconstitutional, and one group has threatened to challenge the provisions in court. However, such a challenge would be very unlikely to succeed.

In the 1997 case Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General), a unanimous Supreme Court of Canada stated that limits on third parties are essential, and must be lower than those on official candidates, since "it is the candidates and political parties that are running for election. ... Otherwise, owing to their numbers, the impact of such spending on one of the candidates or political parties to the detriment of the others could be disproportionate."

The judges wrote that "such spending limits are necessary to prevent the most affluent from monopolizing election discourse."

Any challenge to the proposed third-party spending provisions would have a difficult time overcoming such a strong endorsement of the right to a democratic level playing field. The proposed limits would not stop a third party from expressing his or her support for a candidate or party. They can shout it from the rooftops if they wish. The law would merely prevent some voices from being heard disproportionately more than others because of their wealth, a democratic objective if there ever was one.

Manitobans deserve a democratic electoral system that does not compromise the philosophy of "one person, one vote" by allowing wealthy special interests to use their money to gain privileged access to the political process. Halting contributions from corporations and unions, placing limits on other contributions, and limiting the influence of third-party advertising will go a long way toward achieving this.